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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HERNANDEZ V. NEW YORK: DID THE 
SUPREME COURT INTEND TO OVERRULE BATSON'S STANDARD OF 
"RACIALLY NEUTRAL"? 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of peremptory challenges in jury trials dates back to the 
early days of English common law, which allowed a defendant on trial 
for a felony to challenge thirty-five jurors and the prosecutor to chal­
lenge an unlimited number of jurors peremptorily. I However, because 
the prosecutor's unlimited number of peremptory challenges resulted 
in infinite delays, the procedure was changed by statute, The Ordi­
nance for Inquests, which required a prosecutor to assign a "[clause 
certain" for challenging jurors.2 Nevertheless, the widely-held belief 
that a proper jury trial required peremptory challenges on both sides 
prevailed, and the statute was construed to allow the prosecutor to 
"stand aside" any juror after examination until the entire panel had 
been examined and the defendant had exercised his or her challenges. 3 
This system carried over into the American jury system, which pro­
vided both sides with the right to utilize such challenges. Today, de­
spite much criticism by commentators4 the peremptory challenge 
system continues. 5 
1. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212:13 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
2. [d. at 213 (citing The Ordinance for Inquests, 1305, 33 Edw. I, stat. 4 (Eng.». 
Challenges for cause allow rejection ofjurors on a "narrowly specified, provable and legally 
cognizable basis of partiality." [d. at 220. Peremptory challenges, on the other hand, al­
low rejection of a juror for a "real or imagined partiality." [d. 
3. [d. at 213. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), dissenting Chief Justice 
Burger explained that 
[p]eremptory challenges have long been viewed as a means to achieve an impartial 
jury that will be sympathetic toward neither an accused nor witnesses for the 
State on the basis of some shared factor of race, religion, occupation, or other 
characteristic.... [T]he peremptory challenge is "essential to the fairness of trial 
by jury." 
[d. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
4. See infra note 33. 
5. Swain, 380 U.S. at 216-17; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). Rule 24(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: 
(b) Peremptory Challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by death, each 
side is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, the government is entitled to [six] per­
emptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory 
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The major criticism that commentators have directed at the per­
emptory challenge system is that it has been used to exclude potential 
jurors on the basis of race, and therefore it perpetuates racial discrimi­
nation.6 A discriminatory result is objectionable for several reasons. 
First, it violates the defendant's right under the Equal Protection 
Clause7 to trial by an impartial jury by "eliminating a particular 
group's experiences and perspectives from the interaction on the jury 
panel."8 Second, denial of the opportunity to serve as a juror may be 
perceived by the excluded juror as a badge of inferiority.9 Third, the 
use of peremptory challenges as a vehicle to discriminate on the basis 
of race erodes public confidence in our judicial system. 10 
challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled to [three] peremptory chal­
lenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants 
additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or 
jointly. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). 
6. See, e.g., Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1989) [hereinafter Due Process Limits]; Robert M. O'Connell, Note, 
The Elimination 0/RaCism/rom Jury Selection: Challenging the Peremptory Challenge, 32 
B.C. L. REV. 433 (1991). 
7. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro­
vides as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic­
tion thereof, are citizens ofthe United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
8. Due Process Limits, supra note 6, at 1016. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986), the Supreme Court stressed that an impartially chosen jury is a precondition to 
Fourteenth Amendment protection: "The petit jury has occupied a central position in our 
system ofjustice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of 
power by prosecutor or judge. Those on the venire must be 'indifferently chosen,' to secure 
the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 86-87 (citation omitted) 
(footnote omitted). 
9. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. In Batson, the Court recognized that "[c]ompetence to 
serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability 
impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial." Id. Thus, exclusions based solely on 
race reflect a belief that a particular racial group is unqualified to serve as jurors. Id. 
10. Id. Race-based jury selection compromises public confidence in the judicial sys­
tem in at least two respects. First, "[t]he courts jeopardize their moral authority as chief 
enforcer of antidiscrimination norms, unless they impose the same requirements on them­
selves." Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose 
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 749 (1992). Second, the use ofunconstitu­
tional jury selection procedures "cast[s] doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process 
by creating the appearance of bias in individual cases." Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, 
Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence 0/a Delicate 
Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,62 (1988). Specifically, "[p]eople may believe 
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The Supreme Court recognized this potential for abuse and held 
in Batson v. Kentucky that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
was subject to judicial review in Batson v. Kentucky.II Batson in­
volved a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike all Afri­
can-American potential jurors from the jury venire. In Batson, the 
Court devised a three-pronged test for evaluating a defendant's claim 
that a prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges in a manner 
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 
First, the defendant must make a prima facie case of discrimina­
tion. I3 Upon such a prima facie showing, the prosecutor must provide 
a racially neutral explanation for exercising the objectionable strikes. 14 
The trial court then has the duty to determine if the defendant has 
established purposeful discrimination. IS Because of the variety ofjury 
selection practices followed in state and federal trial courts, however, 
the Supreme Court deferred to those lower courts the task of formulat­
ing procedures for best implementing its decision. I6 The lower courts 
had great difficulty implementing the decision,n and the Supreme 
Court has recently had to revisit Batson on an almost regular basis to 
resolve several of its unanswered questions}S One such issue was 
that an all-white jury will be biased against a black defendant, or biased in favor of a white 
defendant accused of a crime against a black victim." Underwood, supra at 748. 
In the latest and most tragic example, riots erupted in Los Angeles, California on 
April 29, 1992, after a virtually all-white, suburban jury that included no African-Ameri­
can jurors, acquitted four white police officers of the videotaped beating of African -Ameri­
can motorist Rodney King. This national tragedy resulted in at least 54 deaths and an 
estimated $1 billion in property damage. 
11. 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986). 
12. Id. at 96-98. See infra text accompanying notes 59-69 for a discussion of Bat-
son's three-pronged test. 
13. Id. at 93-94. 
14. Id. at 98. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 99 n.24. 
17. See Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Imple­
mentation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1991). 
18. One commentator suggested that Batson left seven unanswered questions: (1) 
What constitutes a prima facie case of discrimination? (2) What qualifies as a racially 
neutral explanation? (3) How should a court remedy improper exclusion? (4) Should rep­
resentation of the targeted group on the jury nullify the prima facie inference of discrimina­
tion? (5) Is discrimination on non-racial bases allowed? (6) Does the defendant have 
standing to object to discrimination against prospective jurors of a race other than his own? 
(7) Is racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges by defense permissible? 
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum 
for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187, 188 n.14 (1989) (citing Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the 
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989». 
Recently the Supreme Court has addressed several of Batson's unresolved issues. In 
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what, under Batson, constitutes a "racially neutral" explanation for 
exercising a peremptory challenge. Under the Batson test, once the 
defendant has raised an inference of discrimination, the burden shifts 
to the prosecutor to proffer a racially neutral explanation for the man­
ner in which the challenges were exercised. 19 The Court's "racially 
neutral" standard, however, proved to be an intangible one. Thus, in 
May of 1991, in Hernandez v. New York 20 the Supreme Court reexam­
ined the second prong of the Batson test and held that "[u]nless a 
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the 
reason offered will be deemed race neutral"21 at the second prong of 
the inquiry. 
Part I of this Note discusses the seminal Supreme Court peremp­
tory challenge cases22 and the evolution of the Batson framework for 
evaluating claims of jury discrimination through the use of peremp-
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), the Court addressed the issue of whether a defend­
ant has a Sixth Amendment right to challenge a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
on the basis of race. The Court rejected the application of a Sixth Amendment fair cross 
section analysis to the use of peremptory challenges, stating that it found no support for 
such in the text of the Sixth Amendment and that to do so would undermine rather than 
further the Amendment's objectives. Id. at 476-77. 
In Powers v. Ohio, III S. Ct. 1364 (1991), the Court addressed the issue of whether a 
defendant has standing to object to the discrimination against jurors of a race other than his 
own. At trial, the Caucasian defendant objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to strike two African-American venirepersons on Sixth Amendment fair cross 
section and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds. While the Supreme Court 
rejected Powers' Sixth Amendment claim based on its holding in Holland v. Illinois, it held 
that Powers had standing to raise a third-party Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
challenge to the exclusion of African-Americans from his jury. Id. at 1372-74. The Court 
reasoned that" [b]oth the excluded juror and the criminal defendant have a common inter­
est in eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom." Id. at 1372. 
In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), the Court addressed the issue of 
whether Batson extends to discriminatory challenges made by a defendant. The Court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in invidious 
discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 2359. 
Moreover, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., IllS. Ct. 2077 (1991), the Court 
held that Batson applies in civil proceedings, and thus a private litigant in a civil action 
may not use peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons on the basis of race. Id. at 
2088-89. 
Finally, in Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), the Court examined the 
issue of what qualifies as a racially neutral explanation. The Court held that a racially 
neutral explanation at the second prong of the Batson test is a facially neutral explanation. 
Id. at 1868. See infra part II for a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Hernandez. 
19. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
20. III S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
21. Id. at 1866. 
22. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), 
overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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tory challenges. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's recent plurality 
decision in Hernandez v. New York,23 which held that a prosecutor's 
explanation, that he peremptorily struck two bilingual Hispanic­
American jurors because he doubted their ability to defer to the official 
translations of testimony, was racially neutral as a matter of law.24 
Part III analyzes the split among the lower courts regarding the 
proper interpretation and application of the Supreme Court's holding 
in Hernandez, and concludes that the decision should be read to clar­
ify rather than overrule the standard set forth in Batson.25 




While discrimination in the jury system was prevalent in the 19th 
century, even then the United States Supreme Court had slowly begun 
to chip away at the practice of excluding African-Americans from jury 
service on the basis of race. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 26 decided in 
1880, the Supreme Court first recognized the right of a criminal de­
fendant to be tried by a jury from which members of his race had not 
been purposefully and systematically excluded. In Strauder, the 
Supreme Court struck down a statute that qualified only Caucasians 
for jury duty.27 The Court held that denial of participation to Afri­
can-Americans as jurors on the basis of race contravened the central 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 In the 20th century, the 
Court continued to confront invidious racial discrimination against 
African-Americans in jury selection procedures,29 and eventually ex­
tended this protection to. other racial minorities.30 In Swain v. Ala­
bama 31 and Batson v. Kentucky,32 the Supreme Court confronted jury 
discrimination again, this time in the realm of the peremptory chal­
23. III S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
24. Id. at 1866-67. 
25. See infra part III.C. 
26. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
27. Id. at 310. 
28. Id. at 308. The Court stated that "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body of men 
composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to 
determine." Id. 
29. See. e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 
(1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. 
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); see also Carter v. 
Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896). 
30. See. e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (forbidding exclusion of any 
identifiable group in the community which may be the subject of prejudice). 
31. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
32. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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lenge system. However, both decisions were met with considerable 
criticism by those who viewed them as seriously flawed. 33 
A. Swain v. Alabama 34 
In Swain,3S the Supreme Court declined to apply Fourteenth 
Amendment scrutiny to a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal­
lenges of individual jurors in any particular case.36 Rather, the Court 
strongly emphasized the long-standing historical notion that peremp­
tory challenges are necessary to secure an impartial jury,37 and estab­
lished a presumption that a prosecutor has used the challenges to 
"obtain a fair and impartial jury."38 The Court postulated that sub­
jecting a prosecutor's chailenge in any particular case to the con­
33. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Per­
emptory Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 169 (1989) 
(stating that Batson imposes substantial economic and human costs while yielding only 
limited gains); Note, Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1472, 1582 (1988) (noting that racism still pervades the criminal justice system and 
modification of the peremptory challenge standard under Batson does not ensure that a 
prosecutor will exercise challenges in a race-neutral manner); Gary L. Geeslin, Note, Per­
emptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 
MISS. L.J. 157, 164 (1967) (recognizing a need for more ascertainable standards for consti­
tutionallimitations on peremptory challenges); Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The 
Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 327-28 (1968) (noting that the constitutional rule 
prohibiting discrimination in jury selection "has been acknowledged in theory, but with 
little practical consequence"); Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A HalfStep 
in the Right Direction, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026, 1039 (1987) (noting that the Batson 
remedy is not comprehensive and advocating total abolishment of peremptory challenges); 
Serr & Maney, supra note 10, at 62 (calling the Batson decision a failure). 
34. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 475 U.S. 79 (1986). 
35. Id. at 221-22. Swain, an African-American man, was indicted and convicted of 
rape in Alabama and sentenced to death. Id. at 203. At trial, the defense moved to quash 
the indictment, to strike the trial jury venire, and to void the petit jury chosen based on 
discrimination in the selection of jurors. Id. Evidence showed that while African-Ameri­
can males over age 21 constituted 26% of all males in the county in that age group, only 
10% to 15% ofthe grand and petit jury panels drawn from the jury box had been African­
American. Id. at 205. There were two African-Americans on the grand jury that indicted 
Swain. Id. However, no African -American had served on a petit jury since approximately 
1950. Id. There were eight African-Americans on the petit jury venire, but none served: 
two were exempted and six were struck by the prosecutor. Id. Nevertheless, the Court 
found the record insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. [d. at 227-28. 
36. Id. at 221-22. The court stated, "[W]e cannot hold that the Constitution re­
quires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his [or her] challenges 
in any given case." Id. at 222. "To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular 
case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail 
a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge." [d. at 221-22. 
37. Id. at 219 ("The persistence ofperemptories and their extensive use demonstrate 
the long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by 
jury."). 
38. [d. at 222. 
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straints of the Equal Protection Clause would so fundamentally alter 
the nature and operation of the peremptory challenge system that it 
would fail to achieve its full purpose. 39 
Despite its reluctance to alter the character of the peremptory 
challenge, the Swain Court imposed a slight restriction on its use. 
Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, the Court prohibited ra­
cially-based exclusion of persons from jury service in those cases 
where the defendant could overcome the presumption of validity for 
prosecutorial action by demonstrating that the prosecutor systemati­
cally, "in case after case,"40 excluded minority venirepersons.41 The 
Court noted that an equal protection claim takes on added significance 
when, "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the 
crime and whoever the defendant or the victim [was], [the prosecutor 
was] responsible for the removal of [African-Americans] who [had] 
been selected as qualified jurors. "42 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Swain, lower courts 
implementing that decision interpreted the above language as a re­
quirement that a defendant must prove that a particular prosecutor 
used peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors in a 
number of cases sufficient to suggest systematic exclusion as a precon­
dition to the court's finding of an Equal Protection Clause violation.43 
The practical difficulties in meeting such a burden of proof44 effec­
tively resulted in prosecutorial immunity from constitutional scrutiny 
of peremptory challenges.45 This result prompted the Supreme Court 
39. Id. at 219-22 ("For it is ... an arbitrary and capricious right ... [which] must be 
exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose.") (quoting Lewis v. United States, 
146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)); see supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
40. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. 
41. Id. at 223-24. 
42. Id. at 223. 
43. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Boykin, 679 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 
1207, 1213-18 (5th Cir. 1971); Thigpen v. State, 270 So.2d 666, 673 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1972); Jackson v. State, 432 S.W.2d 876,878 (Ark. 1968); Johnson v. State, 262 A.2d 792, 
796-97 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970); State v. Johnson, 311 A.2d 389, 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1973); State v. Shaw, 200 S.E.2d 585, 587-88 (N.C. 1973). 
44. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the defendant would have 
to investigate, over a number of cases, the races of persons tried in the particular jurisdic­
tion, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and the manner in which both 
parties exercised their peremptory challenges. Pearson, 448 F.2d at 1217. Consequently, 
such a burden would become insurmountable in jurisdictions where the court records do 
not reveal the juror's race and voir dire proceedings are not recorded. People v. Wheeler, 
583 P.2d 748, 767-68 (Cal. 1978). 
45. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986). Some courts interpreted Swain 
to immunize the prosecution'S use of peremptory challenges from judicial scrutiny. See, 
e.g., United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 
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to reexamine the issue of the evidentiary burdens required to establish 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in Batson v. Kentucky.46 
B. Batson v. Kentucky 
In Batson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional prohi­
bition of invidious racial discrimination in jury selection47 and formu­
lated a new standard of proof for establishing racial discrimination 
through the use of peremptory challenges.48 Batson, an African­
American man, was indicted in Kentucky on charges of second degree 
burglary and receipt of stolen goods. At trial, the judge conducted a 
voir dire examination of the jury venire, excused certain jurors for 
cause, and then permitted the parties to exercise peremptory chal­
lenges.49 The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike all four 
African-Americans on the venire, resulting in the selection of an all­
white jury. When counsel for the defendant moved to discharge the 
jury on the ground that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
was violative of the Sixth 50 and Fourteenth Amendments, the judge 
remarked "that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory chal­
lenges to 'strike anybody they want[ed] to.' "51 The defense's motion 
was denied, and an all-white jury convicted Batson.52 The Supreme 
Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. 53 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the por­
464 U.S. 1063 (1984); United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Durham, 587 
F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1979). 
Other courts, dissatisfied with Swain:S- result, employed a Sixth Amendment analysis 
to circumvent the Swain evidentiary burden. See. e.g., Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 767­
71 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); Mc­
Cray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remandedfor reconsideration in 
light of Batson, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). See infra note 50 for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court's rejection of the application of the Sixth Amendment to the selection of petit juries. 
46. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
47. Id. at 87. 
48. [d. at 93. 
49. [d. at 82-83. 
50. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
Recently, in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), the Supreme Court held that 
while the Sixth Amendment requires that the venire from which the jury is chosen repre­
sent a fair cross section of the community, it does not operate to prohibit the exclusion of 
cognizable racial groups from the petit jury through the use of peremptory challenges. [d. 
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. 
52. Id. 
53. [d. at 84. 
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tion of Swain 54 that required a defendant to establish that a particular 
prosecutor systematically used peremptory challenges to remove Afri­
can-American jurors. 55 Instead, the Court followed its more recent 
decisions embodying the general equal protection principle that a con­
sistent pattern of official discrimination is not a prerequisite to finding 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 56 The Court thus eased a 
defendant's burden of proof, requiring only that he or she demonstrate 
that the manner in which the prosecutor exercised his or her chal­
lenges in the defendant's own case indicated purposeful discrimina­
tion.57 The Court noted that, in determining whether a defendant has 
met this burden, "a court must undertake 'a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.' "58 
Accordingly, the Court set out a three-pronged test for evaluating 
a claim that peremptory challenges have been used improperly: (1) 
the defendant must make a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) the 
burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with a racially neutral 
explanation, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the de­
fendant has met his or her burden. 59 Under the first prong, to estab­
lish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson, the 
defendant must show that he or she is a member of a cognizable racial 
group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to 
remove members of defendant's race.60 The defendant is entitled to 
rely on the fact that the practice of peremptory challenges allows 
"those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."61 In addi­
tion, the defendant must show that these facts, in combination with 
any other relevant circumstances, ralse an inference of 
discrimination.62 
Under the second prong, once the defendant has made the requi­
site showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a 
54. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986). 
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 80. 
56. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
264-65 (1977); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975). 
57. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
58. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). 
59. Id. at 93-98. 
60. Id. at 98. However, the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991), and Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), 
have implicitly eliminated the requirements that a defendant belong to a cognizable racial 
group and that he share the race of the excluded juror. See supra note 18. 
61. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
62. Id. 
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racially neutral explanation for the juror's exclusion.63 While the 
State's explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause, 64 
the prosecutor may not rebut the inference of discrimination by mere 
assertions of good faith.65 Nor can the prosecutor rebut the defend­
ant's prima facie case by stating that the jurors were challenged on the 
assumption that they would be partial to the defendant because of 
their shared race.66 The Court feared that finding such general asser­
tions sufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case would leave 
the Equal Protection Clause "'but a vain and illusory require­
ment.' "67 Because of this concern, the Court required that a prosecu­
tor "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be 
tried."68 Finally, under the third prong, the trial court must deter­
mme whether the defendant has established purposeful 
discrimination.69 
Through this burden shifting system, the Court attempted to 
strike the difficult balance between maintaining the traditional charac­
ter of the peremptory challenge and reducing its susceptibility to 
abuse.70 The Court, however, was unpersuaded by the State's sugges­
tion that its decision would create administrative difficulties,71 and de­
clined to fully delineate the equal protection constraints on the use of 
peremptories and to formulate particular procedures to be followed in 
implementing its decision. 72 
Not surprisingly, the lack of delineation of any standards gov­
erning the application ofBatson left the lower courts with many unan­
swered questions and without much guidance in handling Batson 
claims.73 The resulting ambiguity is especially problematic with re­
spect to the second prong of the analysis, which requires a court to 
63. Jd. at 97. 
64. Jd. For the standard governing challenges for cause, see supra note 2. 
65. Jd. at 98 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972». 
66. Jd. at 97. 
67. Jd. at 98 (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935». 
68. Jd. at 98 & n.20 (stating that the "prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably 
specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges") (quoting 
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981». 
69. Jd. at 98. 
70. Jd. at 99 n.22. Justice Burger suggested that the Court had a different motive: 
"The Court never applies [a] conventional equal protection framework to the claims at 
hand. perhaps to avoid acknowledging that the state interest involved here has historically 
been regarded by this Court as substantial, if not compelling." Jd. at 125 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
71. Jd. at 99. 
72. Jd. at 99 n.24. 
73. Regarding the lack of such guidance. Chief Justice Burger protested in his dis­
senting opinion that "a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of 'legitimate reasons' for 
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assess the racial neutrality of a prosecutor's proffered explanation. In­
deed, under Batson, "racially neutral" has meant many different 
things to many different courtS.74 
The Supreme Court recognized the need to provide greater clarity 
for lower courts in implementing the second prong ofBatson, and thus 
exercising the challenge will be difficult to distinguish from a challenge for cause." Batson, 
476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, C.l., dissenting). 
74. For example, in State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), the prose­
cutor used a peremptory challenge to remove a nurse from the jury because it was the 
prosecutor's "experience that nurses were compassionate and thus inclined to feel sorry for 
defendants." Id. at 272. The Butler court held that this explanation was insufficient under 
Batson, stating that the prosecutor's prior experience was not a reason "related to the case 
to be tried." Id. 
Reaching the opposite result, the court in Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1987) (en banc), cert. granted, 486 U.S. 1004 (1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 754 
(1989), declined to review the sufficiency of the prosecutor's explanations for striking 13 
African-American venirepersons, including a postal worker who was struck because the 
prosecutor "had not had very good luck with postal employees." Id. at 205. The 
Tompkins court stated that Batson explicitly provides that a "prosecuting attorney is free 
to exercise his [or her] peremptory [challenges], provided that they are non-race related." 
Id. 
In addition, other lower courts were divided on the issue of how to assess the racial 
neutrality of a prosecutor's explanation for striking a venireperson where another 
venireperson exhibiting the same characteristic was empaneled. Some of the courts that 
addressed this issue held that it was an issue of "comparability." Under this view, the court 
was to "compare the characteristics of the individual which prompted the Government's 
strike with the characteristics of those not struck by the Government. In order to have a 
neutral explanation, the characteristics of the struck individual cannot be present in those 
white panel members not struck." United States V. Wilson, 853 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir.), 
vacated, 861 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1361 
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding it improper to exclude an African -American juror where the pros­
ecutor's reasons were not consistently applied to white jurors); United States v. Chinchilla, 
874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the prosecutor's explanation that a juror was 
struck because of his residence where another unchallenged juror resided in the same 
town); United States V. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a 
stated reason for challenging a juror may indicate pretext or bad faith where others simi­
larly situated were allowed to serve). 
Other courts have rejected this view and have held that a prosecutor's explanation 
does not fail the second prong of Batson solely because an unchallenged juror exhibited the 
same characteristic as that for which the minority juror was stricken. See, e.g., United 
States V. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551 (lith Cir. 1991) (holding that prior family involve­
ment with drug charges was a racially neutral reason for striking two African-American 
venirepersons notwithstanding the fact that an unchallenged white juror exhibited the same 
characteristic); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362 (lith Cir. 1990) (stating that com­
paring attributes may be useful in assessing whether or not an explanation is pretextual, but 
it is not determinative). These courts have rejected a "comparability" approach on the 
grounds that the attributes relied upon by the prosecutor in striking potential jurors are not 
always easily compared and such comparisons often require a difficult determination of the 
degree to which the prospective juror exhibits the particular attribute. Bennett, 928 F.2d at 
1552; Alston, 895 F.2d at 1367 n.5. 
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the Court granted certiorari in Hernandez v. New York 7S to review the 
sufficiency of the prosecutor's explanation for excluding Spanish/Eng­
lish bilingual jurors in a case against a Hispanic defendant. 
II. HERNANDEZ V. NEW YORK 76 
Hernandez, a Hispanic-American, was convicted on two counts 
of attempted murder and two counts of criminal possession of a 
weapon, arising out of an incident in which he had fired several shots 
at a young woman friend and her mother.77 After the voir dire exami­
nation of sixty-three potential jurors was completed, and nine jurors 
were empaneled, the defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's use 
of four peremptory challenges to exclude all potential jurors with His­
panic surnames.78 The prosecutor, without waiting for a ruling on 
whether the defendant had established a prima facie case of racial dis­
crimination, volunteered that he had challenged the jurors in ques­
tion79 because he doubted their ability to accept the official court 
translation of the testimony of the Spanish-speaking witnesses.8o Spe­
cifically, the prosecutor explained that when he asked each juror 
whether or not he or she could accept the interpreter as the final arbi­
ter of what was said, each juror looked away and said with hesitancy, 
not that he or she could, but that he or she would try to follow the 
interpreter.8l In addition, the prosecutor expressed a lack of knowl­
edge as to which jurors were Hispanic and argued that the fact that 
75. 498 U.S. 894 (1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
76. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
77. Id. at 1864. 
78. The prosecutor challenged the only three potential jurors with definite Hispanic 
surnames. However, the ethnicity of one of the challenged bilingual jurors was uncertain. 
Id. at 1865. Hernandez did not address whether this showing alone was sufficient to estab· 
lish a prima facie case of discrimination. Instead, the Court held that "[o]nce a prosecutor 
has offered a race-neutral explanation and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question 
of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a 
prima facie showing becomes moot." Id. at 1866. 
At least one lower court has suggested that such a showing would not be sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case. Mejia v. State, 599 A.2d 1207 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). In 
Mejia, the Maryland Court of Appeals warned that surname alone tells little: "Did Rita 
Casini, for instance, cease to be Hispanic on the day she assumed the name Rita Hayworth? 
Did Lucille Ball, on the other hand, become Hispanic whenever she travelled as 'Mrs. Desi 
Arnaz?'" Id. at 1214. The court went on to suggest that "[u]nless tightly restrained, Bat­
son v. Kentucky could easily denigrate into an ethnic parlor game," id. at 1215 (italics 
added), called" 'Who is What and How Do We Know ItT" Id. at 1208. 
79. Hernandez pressed his Batson claim only with respect to the two Spanish-speak­
ing potential jurors. The other two potential jurors had brothers who had been prosecuted 
by the same district attorney's office. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1864. 
80. Id. at 1864-65. 
81. Id. at 1865. 
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the victims and all of the key witnesses for the government were His­
panic-Americans undercut any possibility of a motive on the govern­
ment's part to exclude this group from the jury. 82 
The trial court accepted the prosecutor's reasoning and denied 
the defendant's mistrial motion. 83 The case was tried with no His­
panic-Americans on the jury, and the defendant was convicted. The 
Supreme Court Appellate Division affirmed the conviction,84 as did 
the Court of Appeals of New York.8S In a plurality decision,86 the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the New York state courts' 
holdings that the prosecutor did not use peremptory challenges in a 
manner violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 87 
A. The Supreme Court's Decision 88 
1. Justice Kennedy's Plurality Opinion89 
In a decision affirming the state appellate courts, Justice Ken­
nedy, joined by three others,90 reiterated the fundamental principle 
that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,"91 and stated that a 
neutral explanation for the purposes of the second prong of the Batson 
test "means an explanation based on something other than the race of 
82. Id. at 1864-65; see a/so United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 
1986) (holding that the fact that key witnesses for both sides were African-American un­
dercut the prosecutor's motive to strike African-American potential jurors based on race), 
rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 58 (1988). 
83. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1865. 
84. People v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 552 
N.E.2d 621 (N.Y.), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 894 (1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
85. People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y.), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 894 (1990), 
aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
86. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice 
White, delivered the opinion of the court (hereinafter referred to as the "plurality" or 
"Kennedy" opinion). Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1864. Justice O'Connor, with whom Jus­
tice Scalia joined, filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Jus­
tice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1875 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Justice Blackmun filed a statement of dissent, agreeing with Part II of Justice 
Stevens' dissenting opinion. Id. at 1875 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. at 1873. 
88. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
89. Id. at 1864. 
90. See supra note 86. 
91. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting Arlington Heights V. Metropolitan Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977»; see Washington V. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 
(1976) ("Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an 
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. "). 
328 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:315 
the juror."92 As such, Justice Kennedy concluded that "the facial va­
lidity of the prosecutor's explanation"93 is the pivotal issue under the 
second prong of the Batson test: "whether, assuming the proffered 
reasons [to be true], the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause 
as a matter of law."94 Specifically, Justice Kennedy found that an ex­
planation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause per se unless it 
is inherent in the explanation that the prosecutor acted" 'because of,' 
not merely 'in spite of' " the prospective juror's race.9S 
Justice Kennedy then addressed the issue of whether an explana­
tion resulting in disproportionate removal of jurors of a particular ra­
cial group, standing alone, constituted a per se violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.96 Justice Kennedy concluded that assuming, argu­
endo, it could be established that a high percentage of bilingual jurors 
would have responded similarly to the prosecutor's questions, and 
thus would have been excluded under the prosecutor's criteria, that 
fact alone would not have caused the explanation to fail the race-neu­
trality test.97 Justice Kennedy noted that "[a]n argument relating to 
the impact of a classification does not alone show its purpose"98 and, 
therefore, is not conclusive at the second prong of the Batson inquiry, 
which merely requires the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral ex­
planation for striking jurors.99 Justice Kennedy opined that such dis­
92. Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1866. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68 for an 
explanation of the Batson standard of "racially neutral." 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979»; see 
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987). 
96. The Court did not reach the issue of whether Spanish language ability bears such 
a close relation to ethnicity that a peremptory challenge on that ground would violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy noted that the Court need not address this issue 
since the prosecutor did not rely on that criterion alone. Hernandez, IllS. Ct. at 1867. 
Instead, the prosecutor explained that the jurors' specific responses and demeanor during 
voir dire prompted the strikes. However, the defendant urged that notwithstanding the 
prosecutor's focus on the individual responses of the jurors, the prosecutor's explanation 
had the effect of a purely language-based reason because "[a]ny honest bilingual juror 
would have answered the prosecutor in the exact same way." Id. (alteration in original). 
97. Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1867. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. (stating that "disproportionate impact does not turn the prosecutor's actions 
into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause"). 
It is a well-settled principle of equal protection law that disparate impact alone does 
not establish a discriminatory purpose and is thus not per se unconstitutional. See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1972); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); c/. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding 
that the administration of a facially neutral statute directed so exclusively against a particu­
lar class of people constitutes denial of equal protection of the laws). 
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parate impact may be evidence of a prosecutor's motive and, as such, 
should be given appropriate weight in a court's ultimate factual find­
ing of discriminatory intent in the third prong of a Batson analysis. loo 
Justice Kennedy found the prosecutor's explanation to be racially 
neutral on its face as a matter of law under the second prong of the 
Batson test. 101 He then reviewed the state court's decision to accept 
the prosecutor's explanation under the third prong of the Batson 
test.102 Justice Kennedy concluded that "[t]he trial court took a per­
missible view of the evidence in crediting the prosecutor's explana­
tion," 103 and thus the court's decision was not clearly erroneous. I04 
However, the Justice warned that the Court's holding "[did] not imply 
that [the] exclusion of bilinguals from jury service is wise, or even that 
it is constitutional in all cases."IOS In fact, Justice Kennedy went so 
far as to suggest that "for certain ethnic groups and in some communi­
ties, ... proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be 
treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis."I06 
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion 107 
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion on behalf of herself 
and Justice Scalia.108 Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Kennedy's 
conclusion that the trial court's finding that the prosecutor had no 
discriminatory intent was not clearly erroneous. I09 Justice O'Connor 
also embraced Justice Kennedy's holding that an explanation does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause solely because it has a racially dis­
proportionate impact, although such an effect may be evidence of in­
tentional discrimination. llo In fact, Justice O'Connor agreed so 
emphatically with the latter that she took occasion to reiterate the 
100. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867. 
101. Id. However, there is some support in case law for the proposition that lan­
guage discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state statute forbidding the teaching of any language 
other than English to any child who has not passed the eighth grade was violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Gutierrez v. DeDubovay, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (af­
firming the issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of an employer's 
English-only rule which forbade employees to speak any language other than English ex­
cept when acting as translators in their employment capacity). 
102. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
103. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872. 
104. Id. at 1873. 
105. Id. at 1872. 
106. [d. at 1872-73. 
107. Id. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., concurring) . 
•08. [d. 
109. Id. 
110. [d. at 1874-75. 
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dangers of a rule establishing an Equal Protection Clause violation 
upon a finding of mere disparate impact. III First, she maintained that 
such a rule would be over-inclusive and, as a result, could potentially 
"invalidate [] 'a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, 
and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and 
to the average black than to the more affluent white.'''112 Second, she 
observed that such a rule with respect to the use of peremptory chal­
lenges presents the "risk of turning voir dire into a full-blown disparate 
impact trial, with statistical evidence and expert testimony on the dis­
criminatory effect of any particular nonracial classification." 113 Third, 
Justice O'Connor asserted that such a procedure would not only be 
contrary "to the nature and purpose of the peremptory challenge," I 14 
but also would create "unacceptable delays in the trial process." 11 5 
For these reasons, Justice O'Connor concluded, like Justice Ken­
nedy, that a racially neutral explanation at the second Batson prong is 
an explanation based on something other than the juror's race. Justice 
O'Connor stated that a peremptory strike would constitute a Batson 
violation only if the prosecutor struck a potential juror because of the 
juror's race--whether solely on account of his or her race or on the 
assumption that jurors of a given race, as a group, would be unable to 
impartially consider the case. I 16 
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, however, because she 
opposed the scope of the plurality's constitutional inquiry. Justice 
O'Connor believed that Justice Kennedy went further than necessary 
"in assessing the constitutionality of the prosecutor's explanation."117 
Specifically, Justice O'Connor objected to Justice Kennedy's sugges­
tion that, in certain instances, proficiency in a particular language 
should be treated as a proxy for race under an equal protection analy­
sis.lIS In Justice O'Connor's opinion, "Batson does requires not that 
111. Id. at 1874. 




116. Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)). 
117. Id. at 1873. 
118. Id. at 1872-73. Justice O'Connor stated, 
In this case, the prosecutor's asserted justification for striking certain Hispanic 
jurors was his uncertainty about the jurors' ability to accept the official transla­
tion of trial testimony. If this truly was the purpose of the strikes, they were not 
strikes because of race, and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
under Batson. They may have acted like strikes based on race, but they were not 
based on race. No matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the 
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the justification be unrelated to race," 119 but merely that "the prosecu­
tor's reason for striking a juror not be the juror's race."120 
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent121 
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion122 advocating an alterna­
tive allocation of the burdens of proof for determining the racial neu­
trality of an explanation for exercising a peremptory challenge. 
Justice Stevens stated that, "[b]y definition, ... a prima facie case is 
one that is established by the requisite proof of invidious discrimina­
tory intent."123 Therefore, he reasoned, in the absence of an explana­
tion from the prosecutor "sufficient to rebut [a] prima facie case,"124 
the defendant has established a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause-without having to present "additional evidence of racial ani­
mus."12S More specifically, Justice Stevens argued that under the 
Kennedy/O'Connor standard, a defendant's prima facie inference of 
discrimination could stand and establish a violation of the Equal Pro­
tection Clause only if the prosecutor's explanation showed discrimina­
tory intent on its face (for any facially neutral explanation would rebut 
the inference of discrimination).126 In other words, Justice Stevens 
criticized the Kennedy/O'Connor stimdard on the ground that, by re­
quiring the prosecutor's explanation itself to provide direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent, the Kennedy/O'Connor standard erroneously 
imposes a heightened burden of proof not required under Batson .127 
Instead, Justice Stevens concluded that Batson properly held that a 
prosecutor's explanation must identify" 'legitimate reasons' that are 
'related to the particular case to be tried' and sufficiently persuasive 'to 
rebu[t] a defendant's prima facie case.' "128 
Applying this standard to the facts of Hernandez, Justice Stevens 
stated that he would find the prosecutor's explanation insufficient, as a 
explanation ... may be, the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause 
unless it is based on race. 
Id. at 1874 (citation omitted). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1875. 
122. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Marshall, and joined in part by Justice 
Blackmun. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1875 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
123. Id. at 1875. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 1876. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1875 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 & n.20 (1986». 
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matter of law, to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination for three 
reasons. First, the justification would result in a "disproportionate 
disqualification of Spanish-speaking venirepersons."129 Therefore, be­
cause disparate impact is itself evidence of discriminatory purpose, an 
explanation producing a disparate impact could not rebut the prima 
facie case. Second, Justice Stevens maintained that since the prosecu­
tor's concern could have been accommodated by less drastic means,13o 
such an explanation could not have qualified as a legitimate reason­
for it was not in fact" 'related to the particular case to be tried.' "131 
Finally, Justice Stevens maintained that the prosecutor's concern 
about the jurors' inability to follow the translation of testimony was 
not valid and substantiated; for if it were, it would have supported a 
challenge for cause.132 
In sum, Justice Stevens concluded that, in jury selection chal­
lenges, the requisite invidious intent is established once the defendant 
makes out a prima facie case of discrimination. 133 Justice Stevens as­
serted that "[b]y requiring that the prosecutor's explanation itself pro­
vide additional, direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the Court 
has imposed ... [a] heightened quantum of proof" demanded neither 
by Batson, nor by other equal protection holdings.l34 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HERNANDEZ V. NEW YORK 
Much like its decision in Batson,135 the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Hernandez v. New York 136 is an attempt to strike 
the proper balance between the competing interests of the Equal Pro­
tection Clause and the peremptory challenge system. The difficulty of 
formulating a workable Batson framework is a function of these com­
peting interests, which the Court seeks to balance. By definition, the 
peremptory challenge is "one exercised without a reason stated, with­
out inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."137 On 
129. /d. at 1877. 
130. Justice Stevens maintained that Spanish·speaking jurors could have been per­
mitted to address the judge in a discreet way with any concerns regarding the translation 
during the course of the trial. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
However, such an alternative was never suggested at trial. Id. at 1868. 
131. Id. at 1875 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). 
132. Id. at 1877. 
133. Id. at 1876. See supra note 2 for the standard governing challenges for cause. 
134. [d. 
135. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See supra part I.B for a discussion of 
Batson. 
136. III S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
137. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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the one hand, if a rigorous standard of racial neutrality is employed, 
the historical nature and purpose of the peremptory challenge system 
would be "altered significantly."138 If, on the other hand, the Court 
mandates merely a superficial inquiry into the racial neutrality of an 
explanation, Batson will arguably afford little or no protection against 
discrimination by prosecutors. 139 This problem is exacerbated by the 
inherent difficulty in determining a prosecutor's SUbjective motivation 
and the ease with which a prosecutor can generate a facially neutral 
explanation. 140 
The holding of Hernandez is consistent with Swain 141 and Batson 
to the extent that it continues to prohibit peremptory challenges based 
on the assumption that a particular racial group as a whole is unquali­
fied to serve as jurors, or that prospective jurors will be biased in favor 
of a defendant because of shared race, and other assumptions arising 
solely from the juror's race. 142 The Hernandez decision, unfortu­
nately, also resembles Batson in its failure to answer at least one criti­
cal question, which leaves ambiguous the proper standard of "racially 
neutral" against which to assess the sufficiency of an explanation for 
exercising a peremptory strike. The courts that have had occasion to 
interpret and implement the Hernandez decision have already divided 
over the issue of whether Hernandez's facially neutral standard implic­
itly discards the standard enunciated in Batson-that an explanation 
must be clear, reasonably specific, and related to the case to be tried. 
Of the courts that have interpreted the Hernandez holding to 
date, several have applied the Hernandez standard in conjunction with 
the Batson standard,143 others have determined that the Hernandez 
standard overrules the Batson standard,l44 and still others have 
adopted one approach or the other without directly addressing the 
138. Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of 
Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 293,294 (1989); see supra note 3. 
139. Raphael, supra note 138, at 294. 
140. In Batson v. Kentucky, Justice Marshall expressed a concern that "[a]ny prose­
cutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill 
equipped to second-guess those reasons." 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
141. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986). See supra part I.A for a discussion of Swain. 
142. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86; Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24. 
143. See. e.g., United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Clemons, 941 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1991); State v. Boston, 823 P.2d 1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991); People v. Fauntleroy, 586 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. McArthur, 577 
N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
144. See. e.g., State v. Medina, 836 P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Green, 
409 S.E.2d 785 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1566 (1992). 
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issue. 145 
A. 	 A Survey of Courts Reading Hernandez in Conjunction with 
Batson 
Recently, in United States v. Bishop, 146 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, notwithstanding the sincerity 
of a prosecutor's explanation, his or her explanation is not sufficient to 
satisfy Batson where it is not related to the case to be tried. The court 
held that without such a nexus" 'a discriminatory intent is inherent in 
the prosecutor's explanation'" and thus forbidden by Hernandez. 147 
In Bishop, the defendant was charged with trafficking narcotics 
and assaulting a federal officer. 148 During jury selection, defense 
counsel objected to the peremptory challenge of an African-American 
juror. The prosecutor then volunteered that he struck the juror be­
cause she lived in Compton149 and he "felt that an eligibility worker in 
Compton [was] likely to take the side of those who [were] having a 
tough time, aren't upper middle class, and probably believes that po­
lice in Compton ... pick on black people." 150 When the defense coun­
sel offered evidence showing that a high percentage of Compton's 
residents were African-American, the prosecutor argued that the high 
correlation between residence in Compton and race, like the correla­
tion between language proficiency and ethnicity in Hernandez, was im­
material to the ultimate determination of the racial neutrality of his 
145. See. e.g., Moore v. Keller Indust., Inc., 948 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying 
Hernandez standard), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1945 (1992); United States v. Johnson, 941 
F.2d 1102 (lOth Cir. 1991) (same); Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(applying Batson standard); People v. Cannon, 592 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (apply­
ing Batson standard with no mention of Hernandez); People v. Boston, 586 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991) (applying Hernandez facially neutral standard); People v. Finley, 584 
N.E.2d 276, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that an explanation is sufficient if it is clear, 
reasonably specific, and nonracial); State v. Spears, 821 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) 
(applying Hernandez facially neutral standard); State v. Thomas, 407 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 
1991) (citing Hernandez for other propositions, but applying Batson standard); State v. 
Davidson, 479 N.W.2d 181 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (applying Hernandez standard). 
146. 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992). 
147. Id. at 827 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, III S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991». 
148. Id. at 822. 
149. Compton is an area in South Central Los Angeles, California. Bishop, 959 F.2d 
at 822. 
150. Id. The prosecutor argued that he did not challenge the juror because she was 
an African-American, but rather because she lived in Compton, "a poor, violent commu­
nity whose residents are likely to be 'anesthetized to such violence' and 'more likely to 
believe that the police use excessive force.''' Id. at 825. The prosecutor also suggested that 
part of his reason for striking the juror was that the juror's husband was also an eligibility 
worker and that the juror was approximately the same age as the defendant's mother. ld. 
at 822. 
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proffered explanation. I S I 
The court rejected the prosecutor's interpretation of Hernandez, 
noting that he had offered only a partial reading of the holding. The 
Bishop court pointed out that in the Hernandez decision, Justice 
Kennedy expressly stated that it would have been a different case had 
the prosecutor relied solely on the race-correlated criterion. IS2 The 
Bishop court found that, unlike the prosecutor's explanation in Her­
nandez, there was no nexus between the juror's characteristic and the 
juror's possible approach to the trial. IS3 The court called this differ­
ence between the explanations offered in Bishop and Hernandez "the 
difference between a reason-whether valid or not-and a racial stere­
otype. It is the difference between a criterion having a discriminatory 
racial impact, and one acting as a discriminatory racial proxy. It is, in 
short, the difference between what the Constitution permits, and what 
it does not."IS4 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona reached the same result as the 
Bishop court in State v. Boston ISS by a slightly different analysis. In 
Boston, the defendant was charged with and convicted of possession of 
narcotics. ls6 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's 
decision to accept the prosecutor's explanation that he struck a His­
panic juror because the juror had only a ninth-grade education was an 
abuse of discretion. ls7 
The Boston court agreed, and held that the prosecutor's explana­
tion "failed to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimina­
tion."ls8 In its analysis, the Boston court focused on the Supreme 
151. Id. at 825. Presumably, the prosecutor relied on Justice O'Connor's opinion for 
the proposition that if an explanation is based on something other than race, "[n]o matter 
how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike 
may be, the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on 
race." Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1874 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
152. Bishop, 959 F.2d at 825 (citing Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872-73); see supra text 
accompanying notes 105-06. 
153. Bishop, 959 F.2d at 825. The court found that the prosecutor's proffered rea­
sons were "generic reasons, group-based presuppositions applicable in all criminal trials to 
residents of poor, predominantly black neighborhoods ...[, which] amounted to little more 
than the assumption that one who lives in an area heavily populated by poor black people 
could not fairly try a black defendant." Id. 
154. Id. at 826. The court noted that it was not holding that residence could never 
constitute a legitimate reason for exercising a peremptory challenge and explained that 
such a challenge would be legitimate "[w]here residence is utilized as a link connecting a 
specific juror to the facts of the case." Id. 
155. 823 P.2d 1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
156. Id. at 1324. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 1325. 
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Court's decision in Batson. The court interpreted Batson as imposing 
a two-fold requirement at the second prong: first, that the explanation 
be racially neutral; and second, that the explanation be related to the 
particular case to be tried. 1S9 Presumably, under this court's analysis, 
the facially neutral standard of Hernandez spoke only to the racial 
neutrality requirement of the second prong of the Batson test, while 
the nexus requirement of that prong remained intact. l60 
The Boston court found that the prosecutor's reason for striking 
the only Hispanic member of the panel was racially neutral on its face, 
thus satisfying the first requirement of the second prong. 161 However, 
the court found that the explanation failed the second requirement of 
the second prong of Batson for want of a nexus between the juror's 
limited education and the particular facts of the case, thus failing to 
rebut the defendant's prima facie case. 162 
Among the courts that have rejected the nexus requirement is the 
Second Division of the Court of Appeals of Arizona. In State v. Me­
dina,t63 the Second Division of the Court of Appeals of Arizona ex­
pressly rejected Boston's holding, wherein the First Division of the 
Court of Appeals of Arizona required that a prosecutor's explanation 
for striking a juror be related to the particular case to be tried in addi­
tion to the requirement that it be racially neutral. 1M Unable to over­
159. Id. at 1324-25 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986». 
160. See supra text accompanying note 68 and infra note 169 for the language in 
Batson requiring a nexus between the prosecutor's explanation for exercising a peremptory 
challenge and the case to be tried. 
161. Boston, 823 P.2d at 1325. 
162. Id. Like the Bishop court, the Boston court emphasized that it was not holding 
that a lack of education could never be a legitimate reason for exercising a peremptory 
challenge. Id.; see supra note 154. The court acknowledged that in some instances it may 
be desirable to have well-educated jurors. Boston, 823 P.2d at 1325; see, e.g., United States 
v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1985) (prosecution for wire fraud involving a series of 
complicated commodities transactions). 
163. 836 P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
164. Id. at lOoo. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals of Arizona first ad­
dressed the nexus issue in dicta. See State v. Batista, No.2 CA-CR 91-0367, 1992 WL 
lO649 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1992). In Batista, the defendant was charged with and 
convicted of several different counts of sexual assault. Id. at *1. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the trial court committed clear error in accepting as racially neutral the prose­
cutor's reason for challenging a Hispanic juror. Id. at *2. The prosecutor gave the juror's 
age, occupation, and single marital status as his explanation for striking the juror. Id. at 
*3. Although the court found that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination, it considered the sufficiency of the prosecutor's explanation. The court 
stated that while Batson requires that the given explanation be related to the case at hand, 
the Boston decision went beyond the mandate of Batson in so far as Boston "entails an 
obligation to justify the relationship." Id. The court rejected Boston, calling it "at variance 
with the direction recently taken by the United States Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New 
York." Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991». 
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rule the First Division's holding in Boston, the Second Division 
distinguished Medina on its facts. 
B. 	 A Survey of Courts Holding that the Hernandez Standard 
Overrules Batson 
In State v. Medina, 165 the defendant was charged with several 
drug-related offenses and felony murder. The prosecutor explained 
that he peremptorily challenged four Hispanic jurors because he "[did 
not] like school teachers, young people, and city employees on [his] 
juries."166 The court distinguished Medina from Boston on the 
ground that the prosecutor's explanations in Medina did not appear to 
have any disparate impact on minorities, unlike the challenge exer­
cised in Boston, which was based on the juror's limited education. 167 
The court rejected the Boston decision's nexus requirement, stating 
that it "decline[ d] to follow Boston's reliance on a passing comment in 
Batson."168 The court suggested that it "neither underst[ood] how to 
apply [the case relation requirement] nor ... how [it] derives from the 
equal protection analysis underlying Batson."169 However, the court 
instead seems to have been motivated by its concern that such a re­
quirement would in effect collapse the peremptory challenge into a 
challenge for cause. 170 
165. 	 836 P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
166. 	 Id. at 1000. 
167. 	 Id. 
168. Id. (italics added). The "passing comment" in Batson to which the Arizona 
Court of Appeals refers appears in several places in the Batson decision. Justice Powell 
explained that even under Swain "it was impermissible for a prosecutor to use his chal­
lenges to exclude [African-Americans] from the jury 'for reasons wholly unrelated to the 
outcome of the particular case on trial.''' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965)). Then, after dis­
cussing the types of explanations that would not be deemed neutral, Justice Powell again 
reiterated that "[t]he prosecutor ... must articulate a neutral explanation related to the 
particular case to be tried." Id. at 98 (emphasis added). Indeed, Justice Powell thought 
this language important enough to include an explanatory footnote. Id. at 98 n.20. In 
Justice White's concurring opinion he stated that if required to proffer an explanation, "the 
prosecutor, who in most cases has had a chance to voir dire the prospective jurors will have 
an opportunity to give trial-related reasons for his strikes." Id. at 101-02 (White, J., con­
curring) (second emphasis added). 
Contrary to what the Medina court suggested, it is generally accepted that the Batson 
standard requires a prosecutor to proffer an explanation that is "clear and reasonably spe­
cific," "legitimate," and "related to the particular case to be tried." See, e.g., Hernandez v. 
New York, III S. Ct. 1859, 1875 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 98 & n.20). 
169. 	 Medina, 836 P.2d at 1000. 
170. See id. The court stated, 

While the Boston court makes a persuasive case that the reason stated for the 
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Similarly, in State v. Green, 171 the Supreme Court of South Caro­
lina rejected a nexus requirement under the Hernandez standard. l72 
In Green, the defendant was charged with possession of crack cocaine 
with intent to distribute. 173 The prosecutor struck two African-Amer­
ican jurors on the ground that they were unemployed. 174 On appeal, 
the defendant argued that the prosecutor's reason was insufficient 
under Batson because it was not a reason related to the case to be 
tried.17S The court held that "the fact that [a prosecutor's] explana­
tion is not related to the case to be tried does not render it insufficient 
as a matter of law" at the second prong of the Batson test.176 In reach­
ing this conclusion, the court stated that although Hernandez had not 
addressed the issue directly, the Green court found "guidance in the 
general precepts announced therein."177 The court found no "inher­
ent discriminatory intent in the [prosecutor's] explanation [that] he 
struck the jurors in qu~tion because they were unemployed."178 
Thus, the court deemed the explanation to be racially neutral. I79 As 
further justification for its decision, the court reasoned that an expla­
nation unrelated to the facts of the case may nevertheless reflect a 
prosecutor's "valid concern with a juror's sense of social duty or the 
life experience he or she brings to the case."180 
The problem, however, is that a literal construction of the Her­
nandez standard, without consideration of the Court's intent, disre­
gards the objectives underlying the Batson scheme. 
strike there was not necessarily related to the fitness of the juror to serve, that is 
always true of the reasons underlying a peremptory challenge. They are based on 
ugly generalizations more probably false than true. If a necessary relation to fit­
ness is required, a challenge for cause ought to be sustained. And, if such a rela­
tionship is necessary, the rule concerning peremptory challenges would be 
effectively eviscerated. 
Id. 
171. 409 S.E.2d 785 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1566 (1992). 
172. Id. at 787. 
173. Id. at 786. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 786-87. 
176. Id. at 787. 
177. Id. The Green court focused on the language in Hernandez which provided 
that" '[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the rea­
son offered will be deemed race-neutral.' .. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, III S. 
Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991». 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 788. 
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C. 	 The Case for Requiring a Nexus Between a Prosecutor's 
Explanation and the Case to be Tried . 
There are compelling arguments that the Supreme Court did not 
intend to overrule Batson's standard of racial neutrality, and compel­
ling justifications for requiring a nexus between the prosecutor's stated 
reason and the particular case to be tried. Perhaps the most appropri­
ate place to begin such an examination is with the Hernandez decision 
itself. At first glance, it may appear that by failing to employ the lan­
guage of Batson's nexus requirement, the Supreme Court intended the 
Hernandez facially neutral standard to overrule that portion of Bat
son. Upon further consideration, however, this supposition is not so 
clear. 
In Hernandez, the prosecutor explained that he struck two bilin­
gual jurors because he was uncertain, based on the jurors' response 
during voir dire, that the jurors would be able to accept an official 
translator's interpretation of testimony of Spanish-speaking wit­
nesses. lSI The Court stated that "[u]nless a discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed race neutral."182 However, it did not address the question of 
the explanation's relatedness to the case to be tried because it was not 
an issue in the case. IS3 The prosecutor's explanation for challenging 
the jurors did bear a direct relationship to the particular case to be 
tried: "a translator was to be used at trial to translate into English the 
testimony of [Spanish-speaking] witnesses." 184 Nowhere in the 
Court's opinion did the majority suggest that the prosecutor's explana­
tion need not be related to the case to be tried. ISS It seems unlikely 
that the Court would intend by its silence to discard a principle that 
has been central to its holdings ever since the Court first addressed the 
issue of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Swain v. Ala­
bama. 186 Instead, it would appear that the Court merely intended to 
181. 	 Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1864-65 (1991). 
182. 	 [d. at 1866. 
183. See State v. Green, 409 S.E.2d 785,788 (S.C. 1991) (Toa1, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1566 (1992). 
184. 	 Winfield v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 468,470 (Va. App. 1992). 
185. 	 Green, 409 S.E.2d at 788 (Toal, J., dissenting). 
186. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
Although the Swain Court required a nearly impossible burden for establishing a prima 
facie case of discrimination and found that it had not been met in that case, the Court 
employed language suggesting that acceptable reasons for striking a minority juror would 
be related to the case to be tried: 
We have decided that it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of 
[African-Americans] from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor 
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clarify the "racially neutral" standard enunciated in Batson, 187 leaving 
the nexus requirement intact. The Hernandez Court simply did not 
address the issue of the requirement of a nexus between the prosecu­
tor's explanation for exercising a peremptory challenge and the case to 
be tried because it had been met. 
Furthermore, since Hernandez reaffirmed the Supreme Court's 
adherence to the principles of Batson,t88 the Hernandez decision 
should be construed in a manner not antagonistic to those ideals. To 
abandon the requirement that an explanation be related to the particu­
lar facts of the case to be tried would "seriously jeopardize the applica­
tion of the principles of Batson." 189 An explanation not related to the 
case is not a valid explanation for striking a juror at all, but rather a 
characterization ofthe venireperson who has been struck.l90 The dan­
ger is that a prosecutor can easily devise one or more characterizations 
that would apply to the minority venireperson struck but not to any of 
the other venirepersons. l9l As such, a rational nexus between the 
prosecutor's explanation and the case to be tried becomes a critical 
factor in assessing a prosecutor's explanation.l92 The nexus require­
ment is a necessary, objective litmus test of the "legitimacy" of the 
prosecutor's reason for exercising his peremptory challenges. 
To further illustrate this point, it is useful to categorize the types 
is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he [or she] is trying. the 
particular defendant involved and the particular crime charged. But when the 
prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever 
the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the 
removal of [African-Americans] ... the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on 
added significance. In these circumstances, giving even the widest leeway to the 
operation of irrational but trial-related suspicions and antagonisms, it would ap­
pear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted .... Such 
proof might support a reasonable inference that [African-Americans] are ex­
cluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular 
case on trial . . . . 
[The record before us does] not support an inference that the prosecutor was 
bent on striking [African-Americans], regardless of trial-related considerations. 
Id. at 223-26 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
187. It is revealing that in overruling Swain's evidentiary formulation in its opinion 
in Batson the Supreme Court explicitly stated, "[W]e reject this evidentiary formulation." 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). 
188. See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1864 (1991) (stating that if the 
prosecutor "exercised peremptory challenges to exclude [Hispanics] from the jury by rea­
son of their ethnicity ... [the] strikes would violate the Equal Protection Clause as inter­
preted by our decision in Batson v. Kentucky"). 
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of explanations that a prosecutor might give for exercising a peremp­
tory challenge and to place those explanations on a continuum of 
"permissibility" under the principles of Batson. Generally, the expla­
nations given by prosecutors for exercising peremptory challenges can 
be divided into three groups. 193 The first category may be regarded as 
an "imperfect challenge for cause."194 This type of challenge may 
arise, for instance, when a juror has acknowledged a bias, and then 
upon urging by the judge or defense counsel agrees to set aside his or 
her bias. 19s In other words, the juror has provided and then retracted 
grounds for a challenge for cause. 196 Ordinarily, a prosecutor, uncon­
vinced of the juror's change of heart, would continue to doubt the 
juror's impartiality. Unable to prove the juror's bias as a challenge for 
cause, the prosecutor would exercise a peremptory challenge to re­
move the juror from the jury. 197 This type of challenge is certainly 
permissible under Batson, which permits peremptory challenges based 
on a perceived bias that does not rise to the level of a challenge for 
cause. 198 Such a peremptory challenge is related to the facts of the 
case to be tried by definition, because it is based on the failed challenge 
for cause, which required the prosecutor to initially assert a legally 
cognizable basis of partiality. 199 Moreover, because a legally cogniza­
ble bias, even if not sufficiently provable to satisfy a challenge for 
cause, is a rational reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, it is 
both less suspect and less susceptible to abuse. 
The second category of explanations for peremptory challenges is 
also a type of imperfect challenge for cause.2oo Here, however, the 
perceived bias is not based on any actual bias of the potential juror. 
Instead, the prosecutor may believe the juror to be biased because he 
or she is a member of a particular group that seems to contain a dis­
proportionately large number of people with a particular bias.201 For 
193. Underwood, supra note 10, at 762-64. 
194. [d. at 762. 
195. [d. 
196. [d. 
197. [d.; see, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 916 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1990). In Rob­
erts, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged an African -American juror who stated that he 
would not consider tape recordings as evidence in a criminal case, even if lawfully obtained. 
Although the juror recanted during a sidebar conference, the prosecutor asserted that the 
juror was merely in awe of the defense counsel and answered the sidebar questions in sub­
missive deference to him. The court held that the prosecutor's explanation was sufficient. 
[d. 
198. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). 
199. See supra note 2. 
200. Underwood, supra note 10, at 762. 
201. Id. 
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example, the prosecutor may suppose that schoolteachers tend to be 
more liberap02 or social workers too sympathetic and thus less likely 
to convict.203 Although such an explanation would not support a 
challenge for cause, a prosecutor may wish to exercise a peremptory 
challenge on that basis.204 
Although the first category of explanations is permissible under 
Batson, whether an explanation based on a group bias is permissible 
under Batson is less clear.20s If one accepts the premise that the 
Supreme Court's reason, in Batson, for upholding the use of peremp­
tory challenges in general was the Court's belief that they promote 
jury impartiality,206 then the answer to the above question is clear: the 
202. For example, in People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 1989), cen. denied, 494 
U.S. 1018 (1990), at the Batson hearing on remand, the prosecutor explained that he ex­
cluded a particular minority venireperson because he was a teacher, and that he generally 
excused schoolteachers. The prosecutor stated that "teachers tend to be sympathetic, to 
give individuals the benefit of the doubt, and to go beyond the law and other restrictions 
placed upon them when they serve as jurors." People v. Cannon, 592 N.E.2d 168, 174 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1992) (discussing Harris, 544 N.E.2d at 381). 
203. Underwood, supra note 10, at 762-63. 
204. Id.; see, e.g., Harris, 544 N.E.2d at 381. 
205. At least one commentator has suggested that Batson's requirement that a prose­
cutor's explanation for striking a juror be related to the particular case to be tried might 
have been meant to preclude prosecutors from using such general assertions based on group 
biases. Alschuler, supra note 27, at 173 n.83; see also Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 
217 (1946) (stating that jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class mat­
ter); People v. Cannon, 592 N.E.2d 168, 173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("The wholesale exclusion 
of venirepersons based on classifications, albeit race-neutral classifications, without trial 
specific reasons, is forbidden. The United States Supreme Court condemned that practice 
over 40 years ago.") (citing Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220); see People v. Lovelady, 582 N.E.2d 
1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
Another commentator, however, has suggested that "[t]he validity of this kind of chal­
lenge depends on what groups are protected by the ban on jury discrimination." Under­
wood, supra note 10, at 763. That commentator correctly points out that if a particular 
group, such as an occupational group, is not protected under the Equal Protection Clause, 
then generalizations about jurors based on their membership in that group are also not 
prohibited by Batson. Id.; see Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding 
that prosecutor who always strikes unemployed venirepersons, presumably regardless of 
race, did not violate Batson). 
The response, however, is that the real danger is the possibility that such explanations 
are disingenuous. A party's admission that it has excluded jurors on the basis of member­
ship in a non-cognizable group is an admission of bias against that group, and lends support 
to the inference that the challenged jurors were in fact excluded because they were mem­
bers ofa cognizable group. New Jersey v. Zavala, 611 A.2d 1169, 1172 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1992). Thus, "although age, economic status and occupation are not cognizable' 
groups per se, jury selection based on group bias is constitutionally impermissible because it 
offends the constitutional guarantee of a fair and impartial trial." Id. (citations omitted). 
206. The Court stated, "[w]hile the Constitution does not confer a right to peremp­
tory challenges, those challenges traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring 
the selection ofa qualified and unbiased jury." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,91 (1986) 
(citations omitted). 
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existence or non-existence of a rational nexus between the classifica­
tion and the case to be tried is determinative. The justification that 
peremptory challenges promote jury impartiality cannot sustain a per­
emptory challenge based on a classification that is not rationally re­
lated to the facts of the case to be tried. It is inconceivable that such a 
peremptory challenge, which has little to do with the particular 
venireperson's possible partiality, would promote the impartiality of 
the jury. 
Moreover, there is a real danger that explanations based on a 
venireperson's membership in a particular group are disingenuous, or 
mere surrogates for race. Requiring a nexus between the venireper­
son's membership in a group and the case to be tried provides an ob­
jective means by which to test the "legitimacy" of the prosecutor's 
proffered explanation. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bishop seems to 
have had this same concem.207 The court seemed especially troubled 
by the fact that the prosecutor's reasons were group-based and poten­
tially applicable in all criminal trials to residents of poor, predomi­
nantly black communities. The court required a "nexus between the 
juror's characteristic ... and [his or her] possible approach to the 
trial, "208 and rejected the prosecutor's explanation that he struck the 
juror because she was an eligibility worker who lived in Compton and 
he felt that "an eligibility worker 'in Compton [was] likely to take the 
side of those who [were] having a tough time, aren't upper-middle 
class, and probably believes that police in Compton pick on black peo­
ple.' "209 The court stated that 
[w]hat matters is not whether but how residence is used. Where 
residence is utilized as a link connecting a specific juror to the facts 
of the case, a prosecutor's explanation based on residence could re­
but the prima facie showing. A trial judge need not believe the ex­
planation to be wise; she need only believe it to be non­
pretextual.210 
In other words, because the prosecutor's explanation was not rational, 
in the factual context of the case, and thus provided no objective evi­
dence of a non-discriminatory intent, it was insufficient to rebut the 
defendant's prima facie case of discrimination. 
207. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992). 
208. [d. at 824. 
209. [d. at 822. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Bishop. 
210. Id. at 826. 
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The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the prosecutor's explana­
tion for the same reason in State v. Boston.211 The court rejected the 
prosecutor's explanation that he exercised a peremptory challenge 
based on the juror's limited education because the prosecutor failed to 
show why an education beyond the ninth grade was of significance in 
that particular case, which involved a prosecution for the possession of 
narcotics.212 Similarly, in Buck v. Commonwealth,213 where defendant 
was charged with possession of cocaine, the court rejected the prosecu­
tor's explanation that he struck the venireperson, in part, because of 
his Petersburg address. The court stated that even assuming arguendo 
that the venireperson had a Petersburg mailing address,214 "the prose­
cutor provided no rational or non-racial explanation for his assertion 
that a person who lives in the county and has a Petersburg mailing 
address is tolerant of drug use."2IS 
Finally, the third category of explanations for peremptory chal­
lenges are those based on unexplainable whim or irrational reasons.216 
These explanations, by definition, are not related to the case to be 
tried. Again, if one accepts the premise that the purpose of peremp­
tory challenges is to secure a more qualified and unbiased jury, this 
type of peremptory challenge is clearly unjustifiable. In addition to 
the three categories identified above there are some explanations that, 
because they seem rational, would tend to provide sufficient objective 
evidence of the prosecutor's intent. For example, prosecutors rou­
tinely strike jurors who have been convicted of a crime or who have 
family members that have been convicted.217 It seems rational to be­
lieve that these jurors would have an anti-prosecution bias and that the 
prosecutor would want to strike them on this basis. In those cases 
where the prosecutor's inference about a particular juror's characteris­
tic and his or her possible approach to the trial is rational, there seems 
to be little danger that the explanation is disingenuous. The defendant 
may, of course, still show that the explanation is pretextual under the 
third prong of Batson.2lS 
In sum, peremptory challenges exercised as a result of a failed 
211. 823 P.2d 1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). See supra notes 133-39 and accompany­
ing text for a discussion of Boston. 
212. Id. at 1325. 
213. 415 S.E.2d 229 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). 
214. In fact, the venireperson had a Richmond mailing address. Id. at 232. 
215. Id. at 232-33. 
216. Underwood, supra note 10, at 763. 
217. See. e.g., People v. Powell, 586 N.E.2d 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (excusing Afri­
can-American juror whose ex-husband had a murder charge pending against him). 
218. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
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challenge for cause are necessarily related to the case to be tried, and 
present no difficulty under a Batson analysis. On the other hand, per­
emptories based on perceived group biases are susceptible to abuse, 
and can be justified only when rational and related to the particular 
case to be tried. Finally, irrational peremptories exercised on the 
whim of the prosecutor in no way contribute to the empanelment of an 
unbiased jury, and thus cannot be justified under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
In Hernandez,219 the Supreme Court established that a prosecu­
tor's explanation must be facially neutral. However, because it was 
not before the Court, the Court did not reach the issue of whether a 
prosecutor's explanation must be related to the particular case to be 
tried. Indeed, there is nothing in the Court's holding that seems to 
suggest that the Court intended to discard this principle which has 
been incorporated in its previous holdings on this issue in Swain v. 
Alabama 220 and Batson v. Kentucky.221 Thus, the Hernandez facially 
neutral standard should be construed to clarify, rather than overrule, 
Batson. To do otherwise would offend both the spirit and the letter of 
the Batson decision. Moreover, without the requirement of a nexus 
between the prosecutor's explanation for exercising a peremptory chal­
lenge and the case to be tried, the Court's decision in Hernandez 
would no doubt leave the Equal Protection Clause "but a vain and 
illusory requirement."222 
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